The Intersection of Political Identity and Tools of Victory in The Upcoming Electoral Contest

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Abstract: The 2024 elections in Indonesia will mark a historic moment as the first simultaneous election to determine members of the legislature, president, vice president, regional heads, and deputy regional heads, even though they will be conducted on different dates and months. This democratic event will take place amid a strong surge in public participation, characterized by various sociopolitical phenomena expressed through diverse ideas and behaviors. Such phenomena have been evident in previous elections, including the 2019 elections, and others before and after, addressing issues such as the politicization of religion, race, ethnicity, and other non-electoral issues. This study aims to identify non-electoral factors that may emerge before and/or during the 2024 elections, potentially triggering electoral conflicts. The research utilizes a qualitative approach with data collection through literature review and analysis of sociopolitical phenomena related to elections. Hypothetically, the study's results suggest that several non-electoral factors (social, political, cultural, religious, economic, and legal) have the potential to escalate and intensify conflicts during the 2024 elections, ultimately disrupting the electoral process and/or casting doubt on the legitimacy of the results.

Keywords: 2024 elections, non-electoral factors, politicization, conflict

INTRODUCTION

On the mid of June 2022, precisely on Wednesday, June 14, 2022, the General Election Commission (KPU) announced the stages and schedule for the 2024 General Elections. Several days prior, the KPU had established Regulation Number 3 of 2022, which regulates the stages and schedule for the 2024 General Elections. This regulation stipulates that the polling and vote counting for the 2024 General Elections will take place on February 14, 2024, while the Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) are scheduled for November 27, 2024. The decision on the timing of polling and vote counting for the Legislative and Presidential-Vice Presidential Elections is governed by KPU Decision Number 21 of 2022.

The upcoming 2024 elections hold significant importance as a pivotal electoral event worthy of careful observation. This is not only because the moment marks a historic milestone in Indonesia's electoral democracy journey, where all legislative and executive positions at all levels are simultaneously elected in the same year. The 2024 elections are also regarded as a battleground, at least for two simultaneous agendas with profound implications for national needs. Firstly, preserving the integration and unity of the nation; secondly, ensuring that the hard-fought democracy can be sustained and further nurtured.

Preserving the integrity and continuity of the nation is an inevitability, constituting the sole historical choice of both the present and the future that cannot be overlooked for any reason. Simultaneously, the socio-political phenomenological facts leading towards division, polarization, and social conflicts persist post the 2019 elections and could reach a tipping point triggered by various causal factors at any given moment.

While striving to preserve the unity of the nation-state, nurturing democracy as a consensus choice on how the state and power are managed, which has been initiated and consolidated since the 1998 Reform era, also becomes an urgent necessity both now and in the foreseeable future, which cannot be compromised. However, at the same time, the ongoing process of democratization has also given rise to various distortions and paradoxes that often raise concerns. This occurs because the strong currents of participation and political freedom are also accompanied by the emergence of various democratic paradoxes, particularly since the 2019 elections and subsequent ones, with the increasing tendency of identity politicization. In each election contest, the spread of fake news or misleading information triggers the growth of an infodemic that is difficult to control, along with hate speech, smear campaigns, and so forth.

This study aims to map at least 4 (four) socio-political issues that are technical or non-electoral in nature, which hypothetically have the potential to trigger and cause problems, ultimately leading to conflict within the framework of the organization of the 2024 elections. The four issues are as follows: First, the use of identity politics as a tool to win election contests. Second, the phenomenon of socio-political polarization that has continued post the 2019 elections and subsequent ones. Third, the phenomenon of an electoral infodemic (information epidemic) accumulated from the spread of fake news, hate speech, and smear campaigns. Fourth, the presence and behavior of "buzzer" agents. The focus of this research is to discuss and attempt to address how these four non-electoral issues manifest themselves before and/or during the election process, potentially triggering conflicts in the upcoming 2024 elections.

Various perspectives on identity politics have been put forth by contemporary political analysts in Indonesia. It begins with definitions referencing several experts, including Agnes Haller and Donald L. Morowitz. As quoted by Ubed (2002) and Ardipandanto (2020), Haller defines identity politics as a political movement that focuses on differences as the main political category. A similar view is expressed by Donald L. Morowitz. As quoted by Habodin (2012), in Morowitz's view, identity politics explicitly explains who will be included and who will be excluded based on specific identities in a political activity. Furthermore, because the boundaries of separation and identification cannot be altered, the status as a member or non-member of a group based on these identities appears to be permanent.

The perspectives of Haller and Morowitz share a common thread, whereby identity politics is construed as politics of difference. Within this conceptual framework, identity politics emerges as individuals' consciousness to elaborate on particular (distinctive) identities in the form of primordial identity relationships, particularly ethnic and religious ones. However, in practice, the concept of identity politics transforms into a political tool for gaining power and/or maintaining the status quo by political actors (Nasrudin, 2018; Habodin, 2012). With a more assertive narrative, Husni Mubarok (2018) even defines identity politics as the efforts of individuals or groups to attain power by exploiting specific identity similarities with their majority of voters.

The phenomenon can be found in Aryojati Ardipandanto's article titled "The Impact of Identity Politics on the 2019 Presidential Election: A Populist Perspective" (2020). In this work, Ardipandanto discusses the utilization of identity politics that often surfaced during the 2019 elections by both Candidate Pairs (Paslon), namely Candidate Pair number 1 and Candidate Pair number 2, with a populist approach based on religion, particularly Islam.

Ardipandanto asserts that populism is actually a common strategy that can be understood in the context of efforts to win elections. However, it becomes dangerous when done excessively. In this context, Ardipandanto notes that Candidate Pair number 2 extensively used populist strategies based on Islam. The narrative constructed by them portrays Candidate Pair number 1 as "non-Islamic" or, in other words, supporting Candidate Pair number 1 is considered a sin or a violation of religious rules, and not supporting the interests of Muslims.

Using identity-based religious populism as a strategy in the context of winning elections is considered risky because it not only contradicts the natural diversity of Indonesian society but also disregards the essence of elections as a platform for competing ideas and strengthening democracy. In this situation, supporters of each camp are more likely to engage in horizontal conflicts that can damage social cohesion and the foundation of the nation-state's integration, compared to focusing on the programs and visions of the candidates. Besides identity politics, other non-electoral factors that have the potential to trigger election conflicts include political polarization. Generally, political polarization is defined as the division of society into two diametrically opposing political camps. According to J.Q. Wilson, this factor is caused by strong attachment to ideology or commitment to candidates, thus dividing one group from another (Annas et al., 2019). According to Nolan McCarty, polarization can also occur due to differences in approaches to fundamental issues (Assyaukanie, 2022) or due to hatred towards religion and ethnicity in public opinion (Muhtadi, 2021), and/or the increasing claims of identity politics (Tapsell, 2019).

In the context of Indonesia's electoral political history, sharp political polarization such as that which occurred in the 2019 elections is still considered a relatively new issue. Therefore, research and studies on this issue are still limited from experts. In this situation, the author found some relevant writings, one of which is Abdul Gaffar Karim's article titled "Managing Political Polarization in the Circulation of Power in Indonesia: Notes for Research Agenda" (2019). In his writing, Karim reminds that political polarization is likely to remain present in the context of general elections in Indonesia. Therefore, more in-depth and extensive studies will be greatly needed, with the hope that the results can serve as academic basis for managing polarization appropriately and wisely, especially in the context of election organization.

The main points from Karim's writing regarding the research agenda on polarization can be presented as follows. Firstly, political polarization can be identified from two perspectives: as a variable influenced by electoral politics, and as the management of social polarization in society through electoral politics, either to mitigate it or to facilitate mass mobilization. Both approaches can be used to deepen the understanding of political polarization in Indonesia.

Another non-electoral factor that has the potential to trigger conflict in the 2024 elections is the issue of Electoral Infodemic. The concept of Infodemic was introduced by the World Health Organization (WHO) and has gained popularity since the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic worldwide. The term Infodemic is derived from the combination of the words "information" and "pandemic". WHO explains that Infodemic refers to an excessive amount of information circulating, including misinformation and disinformation, both in physical and digital forms, during the Covid-19 pandemic (World Health Organization, 2022).

With a more detailed explanation, Hermin Indah Wahyuni (2020) states that an infodemic is a situation where information spreads rapidly in a vast amount, with unclear, low, and unreliable accuracy levels. She equates this condition with a pandemic and typically

arises in social situations filled with uncertainty, such as during a pandemic. The main danger is that in such situations, the abundance of information is often accompanied by ambiguity, where all information is considered to have the same level of truthfulness (Wahyuni, 2020).

Based on the WHO's interpretation and Wahyuni's explanation, the "Information Pandemic" has actually occurred and hypothetically could continue, following the conduct of general elections. From this perspective, the term "Electoral Infodemic" is used to describe the proliferation of information related to elections, with a low level of accuracy. In this context, various forms of fake news (hoaxes), black campaigns, and hate speech can find articulation space.

Based on the literature review, many experts have examined the issue of infodemic. However, most studies focus on contexts outside of electoral events. Attention to the issue of infodemic is more often associated with the Covid-19 pandemic phenomenon and/or digital literacy. For example, in Rachmad Gustomy's article titled "From Pandemic to Infodemic: Political Polarization in Covid-19 Discourse on Twitter" (JIIP, 2020), it is discussed how the infodemic, particularly on Twitter, related to Covid-19 has caused political polarization in society, divided into two poles: the pluralist populist cluster and the Islamic populist cluster. These two political poles clash in responding to and confronting government policies related to Covid-19, arguing in the public sphere. Ironically, the conflict between these two poles dominated by buzzers sidelines the voices of critical and rational groups.

The last non-electoral factor that may trigger conflict in the 2024 elections is the role and behavior of political buzzers. Initially, the term "buzzer" was more known in the business world, especially in the field of economic marketing. Buzzers were used as a marketing technique relying on word-of-mouth information dissemination to boost business (Mustika, 2019). With the development of social media, the term buzzer became popular and rapidly evolved. Buzzers not only function as social media users uploading content but also as campaigners in buzz marketing.

From this basic concept, the use of social media buzzers was initially intended to counter black campaigns against a candidate and simultaneously improve their positive image in the eyes of the public, with a positive impact on electoral support (CIPG, 2019). In the context of electoral political interests, the role of buzzers is considered positive because they help build positive opinions about candidates and prevent the spread of defamation from their competitors (Mustika, 2019; Syahputra, 2017).

However, in the recent political and electoral democracy developments in Indonesia, the role of buzzers has undergone a significant shift in function. Now, buzzers tend to become tools for contesting parties to execute various black campaign or negative campaign strategies without authentic evidence and strong arguments. Additionally, they are often involved in spreading hoaxes and/or hate speech with the aim of undermining political opponents, rather than building a positive image for the candidates they support.

Many scholars and election observers in Indonesia have conducted extensive research on the role and behavior of buzzers in political activities, especially in the context of elections, as outlined earlier. One relevant study is Christiany Juditha's paper titled "Social Media Buzzers in Indonesian Regional Elections and General Elections" (2019). In Juditha's research, it is revealed that buzzers often become disseminators of black campaigns against political opponents of the candidates they support in elections and regional elections (pilkada). Such black campaign tactics lead buzzers to engage in spreading hoaxes, hate speech, and even potentially damaging defamation. This contrasts with the ideal role of buzzers, which should be focused on building a positive image for the supported candidates, as previously explained.

Compared to the related studies outlined earlier, this research represents a more comprehensive study on non-technical factors in elections that can influence the emergence of conflict. In this context, the scope of the research covers crucial issues related to elections, namely the use of identity politics, socio-political polarization, electoral infodemic, as well as the role and behavior of buzzers.

METHOD

This research is a literature analysis that is entirely based on secondary data sources, including written documents such as books, legislative regulations, scientific journals, as well as articles and opinions found in mass media in both digital and print forms. The approach used in this research is qualitative. The selection of this approach is based on the consideration that the researched issue has a broad scope and multidimensional phenomenological interconnections among issues, data/information, facts, and empirical events. The decision to use the qualitative approach is also based on the context of the issues under focus in the research. The qualitative approach is considered more suitable and compatible for critically, systematically, and comprehensively exploring and mapping various non-electoral issues that can pose serious problems and trigger conflicts in the conduct of the 2024 elections.

By using this method, it is hoped that the main issues and scope of the research can be explored, understood, and mapped comprehensively, systematically, and comprehensively. As stated by Devine, the qualitative approach has advantages, including the ability to freely explore the beliefs, perspectives, and attitudes of sources, and can explain the questions "why" and "how," not just "what" (Harrison, 2009: 92).

Based on the type of study conducted, which is a literature review, data and information in this research are collected and explored through document analysis techniques. This study obtains data and information from various secondary sources, such as scientific literature as theoretical basis, analysis of perspectives, as well as data from relevant legislative regulations, documentation of news coverage, phenomenological facts evolving in the public sphere, and views from various parties (actors, observers, and experts) obtained from various mass media, both print and digital.

To address differences and inconsistencies in data or information that are widespread or even contradictory from secondary sources, the researcher utilizes triangulation techniques as needed. Triangulation becomes crucial to provide confidence to the researcher in selecting valid data or information for analysis and research conclusions.

Regarding data analysis, consistent with the qualitative approach, data analysis in this study is conducted simultaneously with the data collection stages. In this regard, analysis is performed at each phase of data collection. According to Sugiyono (2008), the analysis begins at the stage of collecting various secondary data. The next phase involves determining the focus of the central issues of the study through taxonomy analysis techniques (categorizing relevant issues). The final phase involves componential analysis (understanding the components of each issue discussed). Referring to the approach of Miles and Huberman, qualitative data analysis is conducted interactively through a series of processes, including data reduction, data display, and verification.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
"Identity Politics, Contestation Winning Tool"

Identity Politics refers to the role of social identities, such as ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and others, in the political realm. In identity politics, these groups form political identities based on these characteristics. Politicians and parties often seek to mobilize support based on these identities, linking the interests of specific groups to their political platforms or agendas.

An example of identity politics involves political strategies based on particular ethnic groups, such as advocating for the interests of minority groups or using specific identity narratives to garner support. Often, identity politics can be a significant factor in election campaigns and shape how voters identify themselves in a political context.

Contestation Winning Tool:

Contestation Winning Tools refer to various strategies, tactics, and resources used by candidates, political parties, or political groups to win elections or political contests. These winning tools can vary from advertising campaigns, door-to-door activities, the use of social media, debates, to voter mobilization and campaign funding.

Some common winning tools involve the use of mass media to convey campaign messages, polling and research to understand voter preferences, and door-to-door campaigns to interact directly with voters. It is important to note that technology and strategies in winning tools continue to evolve over time, reflecting changes in voter behavior and political trends.

The effective combination of identity politics and winning tools can play a significant role in determining the outcome of a political contest, considering how group identities influence voter preferences and how winning tools are used to garner the necessary support.

The issue of identity politics in the context of electoral events in Indonesia emerged and received serious attention since the 2014 General Elections, which then saw a significant increase during the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election (Pilkada DKI). Initially, this phenomenon began with a mistake made by Ahok when he touched on Al-Quran Surah Al-Maidah 51, triggering reactions from Muslims, especially in Jakarta (www.metro.tempo.co, December 26, 2017). This reaction was followed by the 411 demonstration (November 4, 2016) in front of the Presidential Palace, attended by around 200 thousand people, just three months before the voting day. A larger demonstration, known as the Peaceful Action 212, was held on December 2, 2016, demanding the removal of Ahok as governor after he was named a suspect in a blasphemy case. This narrative expanded to include President Jokowi.

In addition to these actions, the sharp increase in the use of identity politics during the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election (Pilkada DKI) was also evident from the confrontations between supporters of Anies and Ahok on various social media platforms and in everyday society. One highly controversial example was the spread of banners with the narrative "prohibition on offering funeral prayers for supporters of Ahok" (www.metro.tempo.co, February 25, 2017). In the electoral context, the issue of identity politics in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election (Pilkada DKI) remained and resurfaced with equally strong tensions during the simultaneous 2019 General Elections. Primordial identities, especially religion and ethnicity, became focal points in all three electoral events. Identity politics, which should have emerged as individual awareness to explore particular (distinctive) identities within the realm of primordial identities, especially ethnicity and religion, in practice transformed into a political instrument to gain power and/or maintain the status quo by political actors. When used as a tool to win power contests, identity politics is treated roughly without regard to the socio-political impacts that may arise. This phenomenon was clearly evident in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election (Pilkada DKI) and the 2019 General Elections.

In the case of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election (Pilkada DKI), identity politics manifested through various forms of expression and articulation. All of these forms were related to the identities of two primordial aspects, namely religion and ethnicity, which were associated with the gubernatorial candidates, especially Basuki Tjahya Purnama (Ahok, who was Christian and of Chinese ethnicity) and Anies Rasyid Baswedan (Anies, who was Muslim and of Arab ethnicity). They represented two identity poles that were not only different but also in conflict with each other in a contestative situation.

In this contestative situation, the Anies camp "took advantage" of the blasphemy case

involving Ahok, which may have initially been unintentional in insulting Islam but escalated into a blasphemy case that triggered massive actions by Jakarta's Muslim groups known as the 212 Movement. The Anies camp capitalized on this case for the purpose of mobilizing voters to win in the gubernatorial election.

And finally, it was proven that Anies, who was then paired with Sandiaga Uno, succeeded in winning the gubernatorial election in the second round. The phenomenon of identity politics in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, which had raised national issues due to its widespread impact, recurred leading up to and throughout the 2019 General Election (Pemilu 2019). However, unlike the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, the phenomenon of identity politics in the 2019 General Election did not directly pit two different primordial identities against each other. In the case of the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, identity politics was more focused on the identification and stigmatization by each camp against their opponents.

At that time, the Jokowi-Ma'ruf camp was stigmatized with various fabricated identities that were relentlessly used even after the 2019 General Election ended. These ranged from Jokowi being accused of being a descendant of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), a foreign puppet, anti-Islam, or having phobias against Islam, being a supporter and protector of the LGBT community, and so on. Meanwhile, the Prabowo-Sandiaga camp was subjected to various stigmatizing accusations, such as Prabowo being an ultra-nationalist, Prabowo celebrating Christmas (a Christian holiday), being a supporter of radical Islam and a caliphate, and so forth (Identity Politics Factsheet, Puskapol UI, 2020). All the issues attached by each camp to their opponents and supporters were non-electoral issues that were not directly related to the technical aspects of the election..

The Jokowi-Ma'ruf camp accused the Prabowo-Sandiaga camp of using the Russian propaganda model with the strategy of "firehose of falsehood," which involves spreading lies during the campaign to influence voters. The Jokowi-Ma'ruf camp also accused the Prabowo-Sandiaga camp of employing the strategy of "politics of fear" in their campaign (Identity Politics Factsheet, Puskapol UI, 2020). On the other hand, the Prabowo-Sandiaga camp accused the Jokowi-Ma'ruf camp of employing the "playing victim" strategy regarding identity issues, while they themselves later engaged in identity politics by selecting a Kyai (Islamic scholar) as their Vice Presidential Candidate. The Prabowo-Sandiaga camp also accused the Jokowi-Ma'ruf camp of spreading hoaxes to obscure the facts related to the failures of the previous Jokowi administration and to weaken the data and arguments presented by the Prabowo-Sandiaga team (Identity Politics Factsheet, Puskapol UI, 2020).

The impact of mutual attacks through identity issues as one of the non-electoral factors to win sympathy and contests has proven to create turmoil and disputes within society, both in the digital world and in everyday life. As a result, there have been many cases where families or neighbors have been involved in disputes due to differences in support and political preferences. The dissemination of identity issues capitalized upon and then influencing the electoral perceptions and behaviors of each camp ultimately leads Indonesian society to a situation of social-political division (polarization) in various regions.

Elections, which are fundamentally stages of political conflict to seize power, are designed to proceed in an orderly and peaceful manner. However, with the increasing hardening and escalation of identity issues, electoral conflicts become difficult to manage and control. This occurs due to non-electoral factors, namely primordial identities perceived as disturbances and attacks that must be faced by each supporting camp.

Polarization and Hazardous Division

In the framework of democracy that values diversity and freedom, polarization is considered inevitable. This phenomenon is something that cannot be avoided, especially in the context of electoral contests. As expressed by James Q. Wilson (Testriono, 2018), strong commitment to candidates can be one of the causes of society easily polarizing into two opposing political poles.

Polarization can also be triggered by other factors, such as ideology and public response to issues or government policies. In mature democracies like the United States and the United Kingdom, polarization arises and persists for a relatively long period due to ideological differences that imply government policies prevailing in electoral contests. Polarization in America, between the conservative camp represented by the Republican Party and the liberal camp represented by the Democratic Party, as well as in the UK, which divides elites and masses into the right-left spectrum with political representation from the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, shows that polarization is a socio-political phenomenon, not part of electoral technicalities. Therefore, polarization can emerge and develop outside the context of election events, as previously mentioned.

In Indonesia, the phenomenon of polarization, defined as the sharp political division of society into two opposing poles, began to emerge before and accompany the electoral contests. This phenomenon first emerged massively in the 2014 elections and continued after the election. The increase in the phenomenon of polarization occurred in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and escalated further in the 2019 elections (Warburton, 2021). Interestingly, this polarization map involves two mass groups involved in all three electoral events, although the Jakarta gubernatorial election is a local election.

These two mass groups involve the Modernist and Fundamentalist Islamic groups (Aspinal, 2019), who supported Prabowo-Hatta in the 2014 elections and Prabowo-Sandiaga in the 2019 elections on one side, and the Traditional and Nationalist Islamic groups, including non-Muslims, who supported Jokowi-Kalla in the 2014 elections and Jokowi-Mar'ruf in the 2019 elections on the other side. In the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, the group supporting Prabowo backed Anis-Sandiaga, while the group supporting Jokowi supported Ahok-Djarot.

A number of phenomenological signs of this polarization emerge in various socio-political stigmatizations containing mockery, accusations, and attacks against each faction. For example, terms such as "radical," "Cendana lackeys," "Kampret," and lately "Kadrun" are attributed to supporters of Prabowo, Sandiaga, and Anis; while terms like "anti-Islam," "communist," "Chinese lackeys," and "Cebong" are used for supporters of Jokowi, Ma'ruf, and Ahok.

The polarization phenomenon described above is unhealthy from any perspective. Such socio-political divisions, if allowed to persist, can become highly dangerous for the unity and integrity of the nation. At the same time, the difficult consolidation of democracy will lose its substantive meaning. The electoral political event, which should be an arena for the contestation of ideas and leadership candidates, will only serve as a platform for spreading hatred and animosity among the nation's elements. In this framework, calls and efforts leading up to the 2024 Elections need to be continued by all parties.

Electoral Infodemic, a Malignant Plague of Democracy

A number of phenomenological signs of this polarization appear in various socio-political stigmatizations containing mockery, accusations, and attacks against each faction. For example, terms like "radical," "Cendana lackeys," "Kampret," and lately "Kadrun" are pinned on supporters of Prabowo, Sandiaga, and Anies; and terms like "anti-Islam," "communist," "Chinese lackeys," and "Cebong" for supporters of Jokowi, Ma'ruf, and Ahok. The phenomenon of polarization as described above is certainly unhealthy from any perspective. Such socio-political division, if allowed to continue, can become highly

dangerous for the unity and integrity of the nation-state. At the same time, the difficultly achieved consolidation of democracy will lose its substantive meaning.

Electoral political contests, which should be arenas for the contestation of ideas and leadership candidates for the nation, will only become venues for spreading hatred and hostility among the nation's elements. In this framework, calls and efforts leading up to the 2024 elections need to be continued by all parties.

Electoral Infodemic, Democracy's Severe Epidemic

Electoral infodemic, as described in the text, depicts the excessive and often inaccurate dissemination of information related to the electoral process or political activities. This phenomenon encompasses various forms of media and platforms, with much content being hoax, fake news, black campaigns, hate speech, and defamation. This infodemic becomes increasingly significant leading up to and during the electoral period.

In the 2019 elections, examples of electoral infodemic included numerous hoax contents spread on social media and fake news sites. Sensitive issues such as ethnic, political, and religious issues were used to spread false information, causing uncertainty, and influencing public perception.

Leading up to the 2024 elections, the electoral infodemic continues with the emergence of new contents containing new issues or linking them to old issues. Examples of political hoaxes mentioned in the text, such as issues related to collective leave, Chinese troops entering Indonesia, or claims of disabling the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), indicate the vulnerability of society to unverified information.

Factors exacerbating the electoral infodemic include low digital literacy of the public, rapid dissemination through social media, and lack of truth verification before dissemination. This infodemic can have serious consequences, such as triggering conflicts, exacerbating societal polarization, and changing public perception of candidates or political parties.

Efforts to address the electoral infodemic involve active roles from authorities, media, and society. Media and digital literacy education, increased transparency, and enforcement of regulations related to online political campaigns can help reduce the negative impacts of the electoral infodemic. Additionally, the role of society in filtering and sharing accurate information is also crucial in maintaining the integrity of the democratic process.

Buzzer, The Trigger of Chaos

The role of buzzers or cyber troops in the context of general elections (Pemilu) and how their existence can become a non-electoral factor that triggers conflicts. Here are some key points that can be taken from the text:

1. Buzzer's Role in Campaigning and Image Building: Buzzers were initially intended as instruments to build positive images for candidates. They are networks of individuals consisting of supporters, influencers, coordinators, and content creators, working together to manipulate public opinion on social media.
2. Spread of Black Campaigns and Hoaxes: Despite being originally prepared to build positive branding, buzzers often become perpetrators of spreading black campaigns against political opponents. They disseminate false information, hate speech, and hoaxes that can damage the reputation of political opponents.
3. Structure and Payment of Buzzers: Buzzers can work in well-organized organizational structures and get paid. There are also buzzers who work as volunteers, especially those who have ideological alignment with the candidate they support.
4. The Danger of Buzzer Existence: Buzzers are considered dangerous to the sustainability of democracy if they use fake news or hate speech to build certain perceptions or perspectives on political candidates. Their modus operandi can cause divisions in society.
5. Elections in 2014, Jakarta Gubernatorial Election in 2017, and 2019 Elections: The text refers to previous experiences, namely the 2014 elections, the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election in 2017, and the 2019 elections, where buzzers have been involved in spreading

negative and provocative content.

6. Threats in the 2024 Elections: As the 2024 elections approach, attention to the potential dangers of buzzer presence is increasing. The Indonesian Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu RI) is expected to take firm steps to address buzzers that could undermine the democratic process.

7. Criticism of Buzzer Roles: Buzzers are seen as figures who create more turmoil, provoke divisions, fuel conflicts, and ultimately create election conflicts, both horizontally and vertically.

8. The Importance of Digital Literacy and Oversight: This factor emphasizes the need for higher digital literacy among the public and strict oversight of buzzer activities to maintain the integrity and sustainability of the democratic process.

In this context, understanding the role and impact of buzzers, as well as taking steps to monitor and control their activities, becomes crucial to maintaining the integrity of general elections and preventing conflicts.

CONCLUSION

First, the 2024 elections are expected to be colored by several non-electoral factors. These non-electoral factors include identity politics, political polarization, electoral infodemi, and buzzer behavior. These non-electoral factors are remnants from previous elections and regional elections that have not been completely eliminated to date. Second, these non-electoral factors can easily trigger turmoil in the electoral space.

Third, to prevent the negative influence of these four non-electoral factors on the process and outcome of the 2024 elections, joint and planned anticipatory measures are needed from election stakeholders, especially election participants and their supporters, in the context of Legislative, Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections, as well as Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head Elections. Fourth, election participants, especially in the Presidential race, need to commit to not using primordial identities as political tools and limit the use of buzzers as election-winning tools. Fifth, the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) and the Electoral Supervisory Agency (Gakkumdu) are expected to work professionally, firmly, and impartially in overseeing and enforcing the law against potential violations caused by these four non-electoral factors.

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